At about 8 a.m. on the morning of May 7, on approaching the Irish coast, the vessel encountered an intermittent fog or Scotch mist, called “banks” in sea-faring language and the speed was reduced to 15 knots. Previously, the speed, according to Captain Turner’s recollection, had been reduced to 18 knots. This adjustment of speed was due to the fact that Captain Turner wished to run the last 150 miles of the voyage in the dark so as to make Liverpool early on the morning of May 8, at the earliest time when he could cross the bar without a pilot.
Judging from the location of previous submarine attacks, the most dangerous waters in the “Lusitania’s” course were from the entrances to St. George’s Channel to Liverpool Bar. There is no dispute as to the proposition that a vessel darkened is much safer from submarine attack at night than in the daytime and Captain Turner exercised proper and good judgment in planning accordingly as he approached dangerous waters. It is futile to conjecture as to what would or would not have happened had the speed been higher prior to the approach to the Irish coast, because, obviously, until then, the Captain could not figure out his situation, not knowing how he might be impeded by fog or other unfavorable weather conditions.
On the morning of May 7, 1915, the ship passed about 25 or 26 and, in any event, at least 18 ½ miles south of Fastnet, which was not insight. The course was then held up slightly to bring the ship closer to land and a little before noon land was sighted and what was thought to be Brow Head was made out.
Meanwhile, between 11 a.m. and noon, the fog disappeared, the weather became clear and the speed was increased to 18 knots. The course of the vessel was S. 87 E. Mag. At 11:25 a.m. Captain Turner received the following message:
Submarines active in southern part of Irish Channel last heard of 20 miles south of Coningbeg Light vessel make certain “Lusitania” gets this.
At 12:40 p.m. the following additional wireless message from the Admiralty was received:
Submarines 5 miles south of Cape Clear proceeding west when sighted at 10 a.m.
After picking up Brow Head and at about 12:40 p.m., the course was altered in shore by about 30 degrees to about N. 63 or 67 E. Mag., Captain Turner did not recall which. Land was sighted which the Captain thought was Galley Head, but he was not sure and, therefore, held in shore. This last course was continued for an hour at a speed of 18 knots until 1:40 p.m. when the Old Head of Kinsale was sighted and the course was then changed back to the original course of S. 87 E. Mag.
At 1:50 p.m. the Captain started to make a four-point bearing on the Old Head of Kinsale and while thus engaged and at about 2:10 p.m., as heretofore stated, the ship was torpedoed on the starboard side. Whether one, two or three torpedoes were fired at the vessel cannot be determined with certainty. Two the ship’s crew were confident that a third torpedo was fired and missed the ship. While not doubting the good faith of these witnesses, the evidence is not sufficiently satisfactory to be convincing.
There was, however, an interesting and remarkable conflict of testimony as to whether the ship was struck by one or two torpedoes and witnesses, both passengers and crew, differed on this point, conscientiously and emphatically, some witnesses for claimants and some for petitioner holding one view and others called by each side holding the opposite view. The witnesses were all highly intelligent and there is no doubt that all testified to the best of their recollection, knowledge or impression, and in accordance with their honest conviction. The weight of the testimony (too voluminous to analyze) is in favor of the “two torpedo” contention, not only because of some convincing direct testimony (as, for instance, Adams, Lehman, Morton), but also because of the unquestioned surrounding circumstances. The deliberate character of the attack upon a vessel whose identity could not be mistaken, made easy on a bright day, and the fact that the vessel had no means of defending herself, would lead to the inference that the submarine commander would make sure of her destruction. Further, the evidence is overwhelming that there was a second explosion. The witnesses differ as to the impression which the sound of this explosion made upon them – a natural difference due to the fact, known by common experience, that persons who hear the same explosion even at the same time will not only describe the sound differently but will not agree as to the number of detonations. As there were no explosives on board, it is difficult to account for ht second explosion except on the theory that it was caused by a second torpedo. Whether the number of torpedoes was one or two is relevant, in this case, only upon the question of what effect, if any, open ports had in accelerating the sinking of the ship.
While there was much testimony and some variance as to the places where the torpedoes struck, judged by the sound or shock of the explosions, certain physical effects, especially as to smoke and blown-up débris, tend to locate the areas of impact with some approach to accuracy.
From all the testimony it may be reasonably concluded that one torpedo struck on the starboard side somewhere abreast of No. 2 boiler room and the other, on the same said, either abreast of No. 3 boiler room or between No. 3 or No. 4. From knowledge of the torpedoes then used by the German submarines, it is thought that they would effect a rupture of the outer hull 30 to 40 feet long and 10 to 15 feet vertically.
Cockburn, Senior Second Engineer, was on the opinion that the explosion had done a great deal of internal damage. Although the lights were out, Cockburn could hear the water coming into the engine room. Water at once entered No. 1 and No. 2 boiler rooms, as a result necessarily attributable to the fact that one or both of the coal bunkers were also blown open. Thus, one torpedo flooded some or all of the coal bunkers on the starboard side of Nos. 1 and 2 boiler rooms and apparently flooded both boiler rooms.
The effect of the other torpedo is not necessarily clear. If it struck midway between two bulkheads, it is quite likely to have done serious bulkhead injury. The “Lusitania” was built so as to float with two compartments open to the sea and with more compartments open she could not stay afloat. As the side coal bunkers were regarded as compartments, the ship could not float with two boiler rooms flooded and also any adjacent bunker and, therefore, the damage done by one torpedo was enough to sink the ship.
To add to the difficulties, all the steam had gone as a result of the explosions and the ship could not be controlled by her engines.
Little, Senior Third Engineer, testified that in a few seconds after the explosion, the steam pressure fell from 190 to 50 pounds, his explanation being that the main steam pipes or boilers had been carried away.
The loss of control of and by the engines resulted in disability to stop the engines, with the result that the ship kept her headway until she sank. That the ship commenced to list to starboard immediately is abundantly established by many witnesses.
Some of the witnesses (Lauriat and Adams, passengers, Duncan, Bestic and Johnson, officers) testified that the ship stopped listing to starboard and started to recover and then listed to starboard until she went over.
This action, which is quite likely, must have resulted from the inrush of water on the port side. There can be no other adequate explanation consistent with elementary scientific knowledge; for, if the ship temporarily righted herself, it must have been because the weight of the water on the two sides was equal or nearly so. The entry of water into the port side must, of course, have been due to some rupture on that side. Such a result as entirely possible and, indeed, probable.
The explosive force was sufficiently powerful to blow debris far above the radio wires — i.e., more than 160 feet above the water. The boiler rooms were not over 60 feet wide and so strong a force could readily have weakened the longitudinal bulkheads on the port side in addition to such injury as flying metal may have done. It is easy to understand, therefore, how the whole pressure of the water rushing in from the starboard side against the weakened longitudinal bulkheads on the port side would cause them to give way and thus open up some apertures on the port side for the entry of water. Later, when the water continued to rush in on the starboard side, the list to starboard naturally again occurred, increased and continued to the end. As might be expected, the degree of list to starboard is variously described but there is no doubt that it was steep and substantial.
A considerable amount of testimony was taken upon the contention of claimants that many of the ship’s ports were open, thus reducing her buoyancy and substantially hastening her sinking. There is no doubt that on May 6, adequate orders were given to close all ports. The testimony is conclusive that the ports on Deck F (the majority of which were dummy ports) were closed. Very few, if any, ports on E deck were open and, if so, they were starboard ports in a small section of the first class in the vicinity where one of the torpedoes did its damage. A very limited number of passengers testified that the port holes in their staterooms were open and, if their impressions are correct, these port holes, concerning which they testified, were all, or nearly all, so far above the water that they could not have influenced the situation.
There was conflicting testimony as to the ports in the dining room on D deck. The weight of the testimony justifies the conclusion that some of these ports were open – how many, it is impossible to determine. These ports, however, were from 23 to 30 feet above the water, and when the gap made by the explosion and the consequent sever and sudden list are considered, it is plain that these open ports were not a contributing cause of the sinking and had a very trifling influence, if any, in accelerating the time within which the ship sank.
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